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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE CF UTAH

NED O. GREGERSON and DIXIE
GREGERSON, his wife,

)
)

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.

case No. 18354
)

)

JAMES L. JENSEN and EDRA
JENSEN,

)

)

Defendants and
Respondents.

)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
JAMES L. JENSEN and EDRA JENSEN

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

May an unsigned undelivered deed which was not

prepared by vendor nor any agent thereof be used to
supplement an endorsed check with the notation

11

1/2 pay-

ment on land as agreed, other 1/2 payment upon delivery
of the deed", to satisfy the statute of Frauds.
2.

Does partial payment constitute sufficient part

performance to entitle vendee to specific performance of
an alleged real estate sale.
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3.

rs appellants claim barred for failing to

discharge his duty under the doctrine of inquiry notice.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

rn the latter part of September of 1971 the Appellant
herein Ned Gregerson met with Respondent herein James Jensen
at a service station located in Gunnison, Utah, which Jensen
managed.

Appellant was desirous of purchasing a piece of

property owned by Respondent James Jensen in Gunnison (Tl-11, 12).
After this initial conversation the parties, along with
Appellant's father, went to the property in question.

The

Property Appellant sought to purchase was part of the lot
upon which Respondent had his home and also bordered the
community hospital.

While on the property Respondent James

Jensen indicated that he needed to retain a certain amount
of the property for his cesspool and drain fields.

Jensen

indicated approximately how much of the property he would be
willing to sell by kicking the dirt and indicating that from
that point to the property line he would consider selling
(Tl-14, T2-23) •
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Appellant indicated to Respondent that he was desirous
of building a dental clinic on the property once he was
released from military service (Tl-13).

He also indicated

to Respondent that he was going to establish an Amway business
in which Respondent could participate (T2-21).

Respondent

indicated to Appellant that he would need to obtain a partial
release of his mortgage on the property (Tl-12).
The parties agreed on a price of $700.00 and on the
following day Appellant tendered a check to Respondent
James Jensen for $350.00.
trial bears the notation

The check offer as exhibit at
11

1/2 payment on land as agreed,

other 1/2 payment upon delivery of deed" (Tl-17).

Appellant

obtained a tax notice from Respondent Edra Jensen which
contained a description of the entire parcel owned by
Respondents (Tl-15).

Mrs. Jensen at no time participated

in the negotiations (T2-26, 2741).

Appellant along with

two others went to the property in question and measured it
to ascertain if it would be large enough for his needs and
to check the accuracy of the description in the tax notice
(Tl-13, 31).
Appellant then returned to Texas and had no further
contact with Respondent except upon two occasions when he

-
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returned to Gunnison for brief visits.

At

these times

Respondent indicated to Appellant that he would need to
come by and finish their transaction, which Appellant
never did.

Appellant also had changed his mind regarding

the building of a dental clinic and establishing his business
in Gunnison (T2-21, 22).
Sometime after Appellant's initial departure a warranty
deed prepared by some third party, and according to
Respondent's testimony was

deli~rered

to him by Appellanes

father, said deed listed both Respondents as granters
although Mrs. Jensen's first name was misspelled (T2, 7, 26).
Respondents never signed nor delivered this deed awaiting
Appellants return to Gunnison to consummate the deal, and
in order to check the description in the deed.

(T2-9)

Appellant brought suit against Respondents for specific
performance, the trial court ruled against him.

Appellant

moved for a new trial upon the basis of new evidence, the
warranty deed above mentioned, this motion was denied, Appellant
appealed and was granted a new trial at this second trial
judgment was entered for Respondents.

And it is the review of

this judgment that is presently before the court.

- 4 -
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE WARRANTY DEED WITH WHICH APPELLANT SEEKS
TO CHARGE RESPONDENTS IS DEFECTIVE AND MAY
NOT BE USED TO SUPPLEMENT THE ENDORSED CHECK.
Respondents do not dispute the conclusion that two or
more writings may be construed together as containing the
terms of a contract for the purpose of satisfying the
Statute of Frauds even though all are not signed by the
party sought to be charged.

Respondents do contend however

that not any writing may be used for this purpose.

The

court has defined the conditions under which an unsigned
writing may be used as supplement as being when there exists
some nexus between the two either by express reference of
inference.

Admittedly the check offered by Appellant as

exhibit refers to a deed to be delivered in the future; however,
no specific deed is referred to, the parties could not have
had any specific deed in mind since none existed at that
time, the notation on the check even if binding on Respondents,
discussed infra, refers to an event to happen in the future
and not to a particular writing which the parties could be

-
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seeking to incorporate therein by reference.

By inference

the notation indicates that the Respondent James Jensen was
to prepare and deliver a deed which event never

occurred~

therefore, said notation refers to a document which never
existed i.e. one prepared and delivered by Jensen; therefore,
no real nexus exists between the two documents.
Further Respondents contend that due to the uncertain
origin of said deed it is not of sufficient quality to be used
as supplement.

73 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds §§ 379, 380, 381.

State that a party may be bound by the writing of an
agent acting with proper authorization and that in some
instances a party may be bound by a writing subscribed by
the other if delivered to the party sought to be charged;
however, the trial court ruled that neither of these instances
occurred in this case but rather that the deed was prepared
by a third party.

How then could a document not subscribed

by either of the parties nor any agent thereof possibly

contain the essential terms of a contract between them?
And how could such a document be used to satisfy the statute
of Frauds.

Even if, as testified by Respondent James Jensen,

the deed was in some manner prepared by Appellant or someone
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acting on his behalf, the court should not allow such a
writing to be used to bind Respondents.

The record clearly

shows that Respondent James Jensen refused to sign and
deliver said deed for reasons more substantial than the
misspelling of his wife's name, in fact he testified that
one; he was awaiting Appellants return and two; that he
wished to have the description verified.

To allow a

document subscribed by one party to bind the other party
when the latter clearly indicated no intent to be bound
thereby would result in the perpetration of the fraud that
the law seeks to prevent.
Furthermore, some jurisdictions have held that an
unsigned, undelivered deed may not be used to constitute
sufficient memoranda for satisfying the Statute of Frauds,
73 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds

§§

369, 377.

POINT II

HOLDING THAT THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS HAS NOT
BEEN SATISFIED IN THIS CASE IS NOT INCONSISTENT
WITH THE COURT'S DECISION IN THE FIRST APPEAL.

In that Appeal Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P. 2d 369
(Utah 1980) the court merely held that the deed could be
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used to supplement another writing and was sufficient to
establish a prima facie case entitling Appellant to a new
trial.

The evidence, as discussed above, clearly shows that

the quality of the deed as a supplemental writing is of
uncertain origin and that no evidence supports the conclusion
that R7spondent ever acquiesced to be bound thereby.

POINT III

RESPONDENTS ARE NOT BOUND BY THE NOTATION
"1/2 PAYMENT OF LAND AS AGREED, OTHER 1/2
PAYMENT UPON DELIVERY OF DEED" WffiCH APPEARS
ON THE CHECK ENDORSED BY JAMES JENSEN.
The endorsement of check on the back by the payee thereof
does not necessarily bind him to the terms of any notation
-on the front thereof.

2 Corbin on contracts § 520, Williston

on contracts Third Edition § 585, Restatement 1, contracts

§ 210 and 73 Am. Jur 2d Statute of Frauds § 362 and 360.
State that a signature must be affixed with the intent to
authenticate the writing.

Appellant James Jensen testified

at trial that he did not see the above-referred to notation
on the check at the time of depositing it.

To allow an

endorser/payee of a check to be bound by a notation on a
check without sufficient proof to establish that said

- 8 -
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endorsement was intended as a ratification of said notation
would allow a party to unilaterally set the conditions of a
contract and bind the other party thereby.
The net result of n.ot allowing the endorsed check to be
used by Appellant as a signed document would be that there
is not any signed memora.nda with which to satisfy the statute
of frauds requirement.

POINT IV

APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EITHER PART
PERFORMANCE OR SUFFICIENT MEMORANDA TO
SATISFY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Appellant further claims that under the doctrine of
part performance he is entitled to have the alleged oral
contract with Respondent James Jensen specifically enforced;
however, Appellant has failed to meet the requirements for
specific performance under the doctrine of part performance
in the following three (3) ways.
1.

The doctrine of part performance was fashioned

so as to prevent the statute of frauds from being used by
a vendor to perpetrate a fraud on a vendee, Coleman v.
Dillman, 624 P. 2d 713 (Ut. 1981) further 73 AM. Jur. 2d

- 9 -
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Statute of Frauds § 405 states that as a prerequisite to
invoking

the doctrine of part performance the party claiming

such relief must show that unless the oral contract is
enforced he will be. defrauded.

Appellant has made no such

showing, the evidence shows that Appellant is in no way
subject to being defrauded.

Admittedly Appellant paid to

Respondent James Jensen $350.00 which Respondent has been
willing to return to Appellant subject to an appropirate
interest rate and which Respondent has tendered to the court.
Appellant has shown no benefit which would accrue to
Respondents nor any detriment which he would incur

without

the enforcement of the alleged oral contract.
2.

Utah case law has overwhelmingly ruled that the

terms and conditions of the oral contract sought to be specifically
enforced must be specific, clear, certain and unambiguous
and nothing is to be left to the court to supply, and it is
the responsibility of the party claiming specific performance
to show that such is the case.

Ryan v. Earl, 618 P. 2d 54

(Ut. 1980), In Re Roth's Estate, 2 U.2d 40, 269 P. 2d 278
(1954) Montgomery v. Barrett, 40

u.

385, 12 P. 569 (1912)

Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P. 2d 857 (Ut. 1979) to cite a few,
also 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 401.
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Again Appellant has failed to carry this burden.

In

fact the record shows that if the parties ever reached any
agreement conclusive enough to be considered a contract
that the parties understanding of its terms differ greatly.
Respondent James Jensen has stated on many occassions that
Appellant has to perform more than payment i.e. the building
of a dental clinic on the property and the establishing of
an Amway business in which Respondent was to participate.
Since Appellant has failed to clearly establish what the
terms of any oral contract with Respondent James Jensen were
he is not entitled to specific performance.
3.

73 Am. Jur. 2d

§

406 supra further states that

the acts upon which a party bases his claim of part performance must be sufficient.

The court on many occassions

has set forth the criteria for evaluating the acts of part
performance.

In Holmgren Brothers Inc. v. Ballard, 534

P. 2d 611 (Ut. 1975) the court enunciated these criteria,
J

improvements must be substantial, valuable or beneficial,
any consideration given must be of value, possession must be
actual,

open,noncurrent with vendor and with vendors consent

and any act must be exclusive referable to the contract and
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in reliance thereon.

No clear cut formula has been

established for determining exactly what vendee must do to
claim part performance each case must be judged on its own
facts.

In this case the only substantial act done by

Appellant was the payment by check of $350.00 any other
act is merely preparatory e.g.

surveying, attempting to

obtain financing, Baugh v. Logan City, 27 U. 2d 291, 495

P. 2d 814.

In no Utah case has partial payment alone been

sufficient to remove the statute of frauds defense.
by way of dictum in Holmgren Bros. supra

has the court ever

mentioned partial payment alone as sufficient.
2d statute of Frauds

§

Only

73 Am. Jur.

435 states that most jurisdictions

have held partial payment alone insufficient to satisfy part
performance.

Again Appellant has failed to show acts in

reliance on the contract sufficent to involve the doctrine
of part performance.
The same burden of proof would bar Appellant from
specific performances on his first claim of sufficient
memoranda discussed, supra.

Even if such a conclusion were

to be made by this court Appellant has still failed to clearly
establish what the terms of the contract were to have been.
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POINT V

PAROL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS FINDING THAT NO ORAL
CONTRACT AS SUCH WAS EVER MADE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES AND THAT IF, ARGUENDO, ANY CONTRACT
COULD BE IMPLIED, APPELLANT FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE PROVISIONS THEREOF.
Since this case involves issues of equity i.e. specific
performance and part performance, the court may review both the
facts and the conclusions of law.

A reading of the two

transcripts of oral testimony reveals that the parties never
reached any "meeting of the minds" as to the terms of the
contemplated contract.

Respondent James Jensen has

repeatedly stated that he considered Appellants building a
dental clinic on the property and establishing an Amway
business as provisions of the anticipated agreement.

The

testimony also differs greatly as to who was responsible for
the breakdown of negotiations.

Appellant claims Respondent

James Jensen in essence did not exercise good faith in proceeding
to consummate the contract.

Respondent James Jensen; however,

states that Appellant failed to follow through with his
promise to return and consummate the transaction.

Again a

reading of this testimony indicates that any complete agreement between the parties was to have been reached at sometime
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after their original negotiations.

The trial court held that

indeed no contract was ever reached between the parties.
Further the evidence given at trial strongly supports
the conclusion that even if an oral contract could be
inferred from the dealings of the parties that the terms
thereof included more than just payment of money by the
Appellant.

POINT VI

APPELLANT FAILED TO DISCHARGE HIS DUTY UNDER
THE DOCTRINE OF INQUIRY NOTICE.

Appellant was on notice and failed to inquire diligently
as to Respondent Edra Jensen's interest in the property and
therefore his claim is barred for the simple reason that he had
no direct negotiation with her and has no signed memoranda
with which to charge her.

In Holmgren, supra the court ruled

that there is no husband and wife exception to the statute of
Frauds and that a wife is not bound by the actions of her
husband.
Record title is admittedly always been in James Jensen's
name only: however, the trial court properly held that legal
title is in Edra Jensen's name by virtue of an unrecorded

- 14 -
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warranty deed from her husband.

The evidence clearly shows

that Appellant failed to discharge his duty to diligently
inquire as to Respondent Edra Jensen's interest.

Because if

he had he would have found ample evidence that she indeed
had an interest.

BY checking the records he would have found

a mortgage listing her as having an interest.

Both Respondents

stated at trial that they have always believed that Edra
Jensen held some interest in the property.

Indeed the party

who drafted the very deed with which Appellant seeks to charge
Respondents recognized that Edra held an interest in the
property and listed her as a granter.

Appellant's only

claim to having discharged his duty of inquiry notice was
the obtaining of a tax notice which listed James Jensen only.
However, Appellant admittedly sought such a document for
the purpose of getting a description of the property and it is
Respondents contention that any claim to having inquired as
to Edra's interest, is merely an after thought on his part.

CONCLUSION

Appellant's claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds
and he has failed to establish a claim under a theory of
part performance or signed memoranda.

Under either
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doctrine Appellant would-not be entitled to specific performance due to the vagueness and ambiguities in the provisions
and terms contemplated by the parties.

parol evidence shows

that no contract as such was ever reached by the parties.
Appellant failed to discharge his duty under the doctrine
of inquiry notice and is barred by virtue of Respondent
Edra Jensen's interest.
For these reasons and all others set forth above
Respondents respectfully request that the judgment of the
trial court be affirmed.
.,,

DATED this

-~
I

day of July, 1982.
ectfully submitted,

DALE M. DORIUS
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents
P • o . Box "u 11
29 south Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
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